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H ow parties of the right represent women voters is a puzzle with manymoving parts. A convincing account must include the three key
elements of political representation in party democracies: the ideology
and behavior of parties, their representatives, and their voters. It is
unlikely that any single piece of research could credibly capture all of
these elements together, but cumulatively, the articles in this special
issue seek a holistic description. In our contribution, we isolate two
components of the political representation triad (Norton and Wood
1993); party (ideology) and voter (behavior).
Analysis of the linkages between these two constituents requires the
integration of several disparate but related literatures. The expanding
research on party behavior and debates concerning the extent to which
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parties of the right can ever truly represent the “interests of women” (Celis
and Childs 2012, 2014; Celis et al. 2014) are related, if often only
implicitly, with the literature concerning the presence or absence of a
demand by parties of the right for women’s votes. The literature that
focuses specifically on gender and voting for parties of the right largely
seeks to understand why the increasing support for populist radical right
parties, mainly in Europe,1 is driven more by men than by women (e.g.,
Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn 2016; Harteveld et al. 2015;
Spierings and Zaslove 2015, 2017). Alongside this literature is a vast body
of research on the “modern gender gap” that seeks to explain women’s
movement to support parties of the left in many Western democracies
but also explores why women have historically supported parties of the
right in greater numbers than men and whether they continue to do so
in more traditional societies.
In this article, we attempt to combine these approaches by conducting a
two-stage exploratory analysis using expert and voter survey data. First, we
map the ideological positions of parties of the right in terms of gender
ideology across Western Europe to establish the extent to which there is
a common approach to gender equality or a common theme in the way
parties of the right seek to represent the interests of women. Second, we
explore whether rightist parties differ in their ability to recruit women’s
votes.
PARTY IDEOLOGY
The assumption that the representation of women was the task of leftist
parties was implicit within much gender and politics scholarship (Celis
and Childs 2012, 2014). In fact and to a large extent, feminist thought
operated on the basis that conservatism and feminism were mutually
exclusive (Erzeel, Celis, and Caluwaerts 2014). Certainly research shows
that rightist parties more often than leftist parties make antifeminist
claims (Celis 2006; Erzeel, Celis, and Caluwaerts 2014; Lovenduski and
Norris 2003; Wa¨ngnerud 2000), but there is evidence that some rightist
parties (particularly in the United Kingdom and Germany) advocate
feminist ideas at least on some occasions (Erzeel and Celis 2016). Karen
Celis and Sarah Childs (2014) explore whether nonfeminist claims to
represent women — that is, attempts to promote traditional gender roles —
might still be defined as substantively representing women if identifiable
1. A notable exception is Mudde and Kaltwasser (2015).









































groups of women support these policies and, as such, Celis and Childs
disavow a feminist application of a theory of false consciousness. However,
even if the assumption that the substantive representation of women
requires challenging traditional roles is retained, it is not obvious that
rightist parties will inevitably espouse antifeminist ideologies. Here we
undertake an empirical investigation of the extent to which rightist parties
represent feminist ideology and whether this varies across mainstream
rightist parties and parties of the populist radical right in Western Europe.
In order to unpack how such parties might seek to represent women
voters, we need to define the varieties of rightist ideology that parties
espouse and how these ideologies in turn impact (1) the amount of
attention parties give to gender issues and (2) in what direction (feminist
or other). Celis and Childs (2014, 7) outline how differences in rightist
thought have varying implications for the representation of women; they
differentiate between social/moral conservatism and economic liberalism/
conservatism and argue that morally conservative rightist parties are likely
to espouse a more traditional view of gender roles than rightist liberal
parties. In the same vein, Erzeel and Celis (2016) find that rightist
parties’ positioning on postmaterialist issues is a far better predictor of the
amount of attention they give to gender issues than their stance on
socioeconomic issues because gender equality concerns fit within a
larger package of postmaterialist issues that appeared on the political
agenda in the 1970s (see also Inglehart and Norris 2003). Furthermore,
various contributions to this special issue describe varieties of
conservatism and suggest that all can be present in one rightist party
(such as the Republican party in the United States), or they might be
more diffused across a number of parties in a multiparty system (e.g., in
the Netherlands the Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA] might be
described as morally conservative, the People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy [VVD] as liberal conservative, and the Party for Freedom
[PVV] as nationalist conservative). Thus, there is a potential relationship
between varieties of conservatism and gender ideology whereby parties of
the right might vary in their attitudes toward gender equality. Parties’
gender ideologies are likely to vary according to their economic, moral,
and populist ideologies; in the first half of the empirical analysis in this
article, we attempt to map the extent to which this is the case in Western
Europe.










































Studies of the “Gender Gap”
Early studies of “gender”2 and voting behavior, such as Herbert Tingsten’s
(1937) Political Behavior and Maurice Duverger’s (1955) The Political Role
of Women, concluded that women were more likely to support rightist
parties than men. This trend is often described as the traditional gender
gap (a` la Norris 1999). However, since the emergence of the high-profile
“modern” gender gap in U.S. presidential elections in the 1980s (when
more women than men supported the Democratic candidate), the
emphasis has shifted from explaining women’s support for parties of the
right to their support for parties of the left. Early studies of the modern
gender gap in the United States gave serious attention to political
explanations for gender differences in vote choice (Bonk 1988; Mueller
1988a, 1988b), but subsequent gender gap literature has focused largely
on sociological accounts (notable exceptions include Immerzeel, Coffe´,
and Van der Lippe 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015). We argue that
the emphasis on sociological factors in studies of the gender gap has led
researchers to overlook ideological differences between the parties that
might help explain why some parties of the right remain attractive to
women while others do not. Recent studies of the populist radical right
have brought the political dimension back in, but as yet these insights
have only rarely been applied to gender gaps in voting behavior more
broadly.
By far the most influential theoretical account of gender and voting in
global perspective has been Inglehart and Norris’s (2000) global gender
gap thesis. They argue that as women have shifted from domestic life
into higher education and paid employment, their political preferences
have moved from an emphasis on traditional values to a demand for
more state support for combining work and family life — in the form of
social spending on welfare, child care, and education — which has
driven them away from supporting parties of the right. Inglehart and
Norris’s thesis is an important and valuable contribution to our
understanding of the impact of gender on voting behavior in
international perspective, but to some extent, it sidesteps the issue of
party politics. Inglehart and Norris use a straightforward left-right
classification of parties to assess the extent to which women in
2. The term “gender” would not have been used by these authors at the time.









































“traditional societies” (those in which women are not well represented in
higher education and paid employment) vote to the right of men and in
“modern societies” (in which there has been a transformation in gender
roles) women vote to the left of men. There are various anomalies that
do not fit within the global gender gap narrative — although Inglehart
and Norris do find a large number of cases that are in keeping with the
expectations of the theoretical model — and we question whether these
anomalies might be accounted for by drawing party behavior,
particularly ideology, back into accounts of why women might choose to
support parties of the right.
It is now well established that there is substantial variation in the gender
gap in party support across the globe and within the European Union
(Abendscho¨n and Steinmetz 2014; Giger 2009; Inglehart and Norris
2000). Attempts to explain this variation have found mixed results, with
the impact of individual-level and structural factors fluctuating,
apparently erratically, from context to context (Immerzeel, Coffe´, and
Van der Lippe 2015). We hypothesize that the seemingly inexplicable
shifting in the power of explanatory factors might be explained by the
mediating role of variations in party ideology, with this impacting
women’s support for parties of the right (Campbell 2016). The immense
transformation of gender roles in Western democracies likely provides
the most solid foundation for understanding changes in women’s
political preferences, but how these preferences translate into party
support or voting behavior has been, we contend, undertheorized
(Campbell 2016; Gillion, Ladd, and Meredith 2014). Accordingly, we
explore in the second half of the empirical analysis whether variations in
the political ideologies of parties of the right can help explain gender
variations in support for these parties across Western Europe.
Studies of the Populist Radical Right (PRR)
One of the most consistent findings in studies of the populist radical right
(PRR) is that these parties tend to gain a disproportionate share of their
support from men (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Betz 1993; Kitschelt
1997; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; Norris 2005). However,
we should note that the extent of the gender gap in support for PRR
parties varies considerably and is sometimes overstated (Mayer 2015;
Spierings and Zaslove 2015, 2017). The literature has principally
attempted to explain gender differences in support for PRR parties by









































drawing on structural explanations for the sociological bases of PRR
support. A structural account emphasizes the fact that working-class men
are disproportionately among the losers in the postindustrial nation states
of contemporary Europe and therefore are more likely to be drawn to
PRR parties than women. There are many more men among blue-collar
workers, whose financial prospects have diminished as a result of the
shift from manual to service sector employment, than women, who are
more often employed in the service sector (Ford and Goodwin 2014).
If structural differences in men and women’s employment do in fact
account for the gender gap in support for radical right parties, then we
would expect the gender gap to disappear when measures of
employment type are included in analyses. However, Terri Givens argues
that the gender gap in votes for the radical right cannot be simply
explained away by controlling for structural factors (Givens 2004); she
identifies considerable variation by country, finding only a negligible
gender gap in Denmark compared with a much larger gap in France
and Norway. In their study of 12 nations, Immerzeel, Coffe´, and Van der
Lippe (2015) also find considerable variation in the radical right gender
gap by country and the extent to which individual-level (structural
explanations) or contextual-level (political explanations) help explain the
variations in the gender gap. Immerzeel, Coffe´, and Van der Lippe
utilize contextual-level factors such as the age and popularity of the party
and its outsider status in their analysis. In a similar vein, Mudde (2007)
argues that women, because they have lower levels of political efficacy,
are less likely to vote for new or radical parties. We hypothesize that party
gender ideology is also likely to be a crucial factor for explaining gender
differences in support for parties of the PRR; we expect parties that adopt
more traditional gender ideologies to secure proportionately fewer votes
from women than parties that adopt feminist gender ideologies.
The lack of systematic analysis of the link between structural
explanations (demand-side accounts) and political explanations such as
the ideological positioning of parties and the behavior of their leadership
(supply-side accounts) is addressed in the special issue on gender and
populist radical-right politics of Patterns of Prejudice (Spierings et al.
2015). The authors question whether gender plays a significant part in
the platforms of PRR parties and whether this has changed over time.
Historically, parties on the populist radical right have been associated
with traditional attitudes to gender roles as a result of a nativist emphasis
on the role of women as mothers. However, in the post-9/11 era, there
has been a shift in the discourse of much of the PRR, particularly in









































Northern Europe, to a focus on Islamophobia and the portrayal of Muslim
immigrants as a threat to liberal values, including gender equality
(Akkerman 2015; de Lange and Mu¨gge 2015). Therefore, we might
expect there to be increasing variation in the gender ideology of PRR
parties, and some may in fact espouse positions on gender equality that
are equally or even more feminist than more mainstream rightist parties.
Sarah de Lange and Liza Mu¨gge (2015, 19) argue that political scientists
have underestimated the variation in the gender ideologies of PRR parties:
they find that not only neoliberal PRR but also some nationalist populist
parties adopt modern views on gender equality. Here, we extend de
Lange and Mu¨gge’s study of the Netherlands and Flanders and map the
gender ideologies of mainstream rightist and PRR parties across 13
Western European nations to establish whether PRR parties are more
traditional in their attitudes to gender equality compared with
mainstream rightist parties.
Moreover, the literature on the PRR has operated largely as though
support for these parties is deviant. Yet recent studies argue that this may
be mistaken and that the explanations for the gender gap in support of
the PRR mirrors support for rightist parties more generally (Spierings
and Zaslove 2015). If this analysis is correct, then the sources of the
modern gender gap ought to explain the PRR gender gap equally well.
Therefore, we explore whether gender differences in support for parties
of the right apply across both mainstream rightist parties and PRR parties




Ideologies are belief systems that are shared by members of a particular
group (Van Dijk 2006, 116). Variations in political ideology will only
lead to gender gaps in party support if, on average, men and women
hold different ideological positions. However, we know from the
extensive gender gap literature that there have been fairly consistent
gender differences in ideology across time and place. For example,
Gillion, Ladd, and Meredith (2014) contend that party ideological
polarization provides a more persuasive account of the emergence of the
modern gender gap in the United States (where more women than men
support Democratic Party candidates) than either the gender









































realignment thesis or other accounts that focus on women’s changing
position in society. They argue that because gender differences in
political attitudes and preferences predate the gender gap and have
remained relatively stable, they are unlikely drivers of the variation in the
gender gap. They find that in the United States, policy preferences have
become more closely associated with partisanship over time; this suggests
that the gender gap in party support is driven by party polarization in
ideology.
In this article, we attempt to operationalize political ideology in a
comparative study of Western European democracies, not using
respondents’ own assessments of party ideology (a` la Gillion, Ladd, and
Meredith 2014) but using external measures of party ideology collected
from expert surveys. The use of external measures of ideology allows us
to avoid endogeneity problems that may occur should respondents to
voter surveys retrospectively align their policy preferences, judgments of
party positions and vote choice and is thus is a complement to Gillion,
Ladd, and Meredith’s innovative approach.
Our measures of party ideology include socialist/laissez-faire
(economic), GAL/TAN (green/alternative/libertarian versus traditional/
authoritarian/nationalist) (Bakker et al. 2015), and traditional/feminist
attitudes toward gender roles (gender) ideologies. Economic and moral
ideologies have wide resonance, which might help explain the attitudes
of the majority of the population. Gender ideology, on the other hand, is
likely to be highly salient to a subset of the population who espouse a
feminist gender ideology.3 We include measures of economic and moral
ideology because of their salience in the gender gap literature and
within the literature on rightist parties’ representation of women. Both
literatures suggest that left-leaning economic ideology is likely to be
associated with women’s support for parties of the left, but a right-
leaning moral ideology is likely to be associated with support for
traditional gender roles.
Expert Survey
There are multiple possible methods for assessing the positions parties take
in ideological space, including analysis of manifestos, roll-call voting,
television debates, leaders’ speeches, voter evaluations, and expert
3. Men can, of course, espouse feminist gender ideologies, but we argue that gender ideology is more
likely to be a highly salient issue that might affect vote choice for women rather than men.









































judgments (Bakker et al. 2015). Making use of expert judgments by
conducting an expert survey is an efficient means for gathering data on a
large number of parties that is not dependent on the variation in quality
of either party manifestos, their representation in legislatures, or voter
knowledge (Benoit and Laver 2006; Hooghe et al. 2010; Rohrschneider
and Whitefield 2009). Furthermore, there is a lack of high-quality
comparative data on parties’ positions on gender equality. The
comparative manifestos project includes a measure of family values and
one on “equality,” but neither measures gender equality per se. The
family values item is very general and measures moral conservatism
rather than feminist values. The equality item measures equality in
general and the protection of “underprivileged groups” but, again, not
gender equality specifically.
The use of an expert survey is a good alternative to manifesto data in the
context of this exploratory study. Peter Mair describes the results of expert
surveys as a synthesis of parties’ past behavior, policy programs,
ideologies, and elite and mass assessments filtered through the
perceptions of the expert; as such, he considers expert surveys to provide
a quick and relatively easy short cut for gathering party position data
(Mair 2001). One of the potential weaknesses of expert surveys described
by Mair is the difficulty experts face when locating parties on policy
domains that are not particularly salient for that party. While this is a
potential criticism of expert surveys with a broad remit, we believe it to
be an argument in support of their use in the case of attempting to
measure parties’ positions on gender equality.
In the main, gender equality is not one of the most critical axes used to
describe party competition in the study of comparative politics. Therefore,
attitudes toward gender equality represent just the kind of auxiliary axis that
might be miscoded in a general expert survey and warrant a separate set of
expert judgments from gender and politics scholars. Gender and politics is
a subfield of political science, and as such, there are fewer gender and party
politics scholars available to participate in an expert survey, with rich
country knowledge, than would exist for a more general survey.
Therefore, we rely on smaller sample sizes than is ideally described in
the expert survey literature. However, the debate in the expert survey
literature also suggests that expert surveys are less reliable when experts
are not confident in their judgments, which leads to seemingly random
fluctuation in scores. Therefore, we argue that relying on the expert
judgment of a smaller number of confident experts is likely to produce
more reliable results than expanding the data collection exercise.









































We utilize data from an original expert survey of gender and politics
scholars in order to capture the parties’ positions on gender equality and
add it to publicly available data from the 2014 Chapel Hill expert survey
(Bakker et al. 2015) on socialist/laissez-faire and liberal/authoritarian
ideology. Future research should collate information on party position
from a range of sources to test whether the findings from the gender
expert survey can be replicated.
For our gender and politics expert survey, we compiled a master list of
173 experts in gender and politics in 15 Western European countries
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom).4 We included experts in our list if they had published
on gender and party politics in the specified country or if they had been
recommended to us by experts in the field. In total, 83 (48%) experts
participated in the survey, giving us an average number of five
respondents per country (the country coverage is set out in Table 1). We
set a minimum number of experts of three per country; this is two fewer
than recommended in the expert survey literature (Huber and Inglehart
1995), but doing so allowed us to retain France and Portugal5 in the
analysis, which we felt was critical to maintain good country coverage. In
this article, however, we do not include Norway and Switzerland
because these countries were not included in the European Election
Study (see the following section).
In order to maximize response rates, we kept our survey to just four
items.6 The first three items measure the parties’ positions on gender
equality, and the fourth item asks respondents to place the parties on a
general left-right scale. In order to ensure that all of the experts
employed the same political party concept, we asked them to “reflect on
the general position of the national leadership of the parties, not on the
position of the party base or local parties” (Budge 2000; Steenbergen
and Marks 2007). The survey elicited contemporaneous judgments of
party positions to avoid the difficulties associated with asking survey
respondents to make retrospective judgments (Steenbergen and Marks
2007, 349).
4. Ideally, we would have translated all of the surveys into the country experts’ native languages, but we
had insufficient resources to do this satisfactorily. We printed the party names in native languages and
contacted experts who were proficient in English.
5. We ran our models excluding France and Portugal, and our findings were robust to their exclusion.
The analysis is available from the author upon request.
6. The full survey is available in the supplementary material online.









































Each party included in the survey was categorized as either “left” or
“right” based on the party’s European Parliament political group
affiliation. Parties belonging to the “Group of the Progressive Alliance of
Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament,” the “Confederal
Group of the European United Left — Nordic Green Left,” and the
“Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance” were categorized as
“left,” and parties belonging to other political groups were categorized as
“right.” Within the group of rightist parties, we make an additional
distinction between “populist” and “nonpopulist” parties. The
classification of rightist populist parties is based on Mudde (2013) and
includes the following parties: Austrian Freedom Party (Austria), Alliance
for the Future of Austria (Austria), Flemish Interest (Belgium), Danish
People’s Party (Denmark), National Front (France), Northern League
(Italy), Party for Freedom (Netherlands), Sweden Democrats (Sweden),
and British National Party (Great Britain). In addition, we consider the
True Finns (Finland) a populist party (Spierings and Zaslove, 2017; Van
Kessel 2015). Nonpopulist parties include, among others, Christian
democratic, conservative, and liberal parties.
In order to measure the economic and moral ideological positions of
parties in more detail, we use publicly available data from the 2014
Chapel Hill expert survey (Bakker et al. 2015). Economic ideology
classifies parties based on whether “parties want government to play an
active role in the economy” (left) or “parties emphasize a reduced
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economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation,
less government spending, and a leaner welfare state” (right). Moral
ideology classifies parties based on whether they “favour expanded
personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia,
same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation” (libertarian) or
whether they “reject these ideas, they value order, tradition, and stability,
and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on
social and cultural issues” (authoritarian) (Bakker et al. 2015, 144). For
each question, country experts positioned parties on a 11-point left-right
scale with 0 implying a left/libertarian position, 5 a center position, and
10 a right/authoritarian position.
Voter Survey
In the final part of the empirical analysis, information on party and gender
ideology from the expert survey is linked to voting behavior. In order to
measure voting behavior, we use data from the 2014 European Election
Study (EES) (Schmitt et al. 2015). The EES survey is a postelection
survey that includes representative national samples of the population
(aged 18 or older7) in all European Union member states. The EES data
are very useful for this particular study because data were collected in
May and June 2014.8 This timing was close to that of the gender expert
survey in 2015, which maximizes the comparability of data and parties
across the two surveys. The EES uses a standardized questionnaire that
was identical in the various member states (albeit translated to the
appropriate national language). The sample size in each country is
approximately 1,100 interviews. In this article, we focus only on the 13
West European countries that are also covered in the gender expert
survey.9 Response rates in the countries under study range between 38%
(Netherlands) and 84% (Portugal) (Schmitt et al. 2015; see Appendix A
in the supplementary material online for response rates for all countries).10
The EES includes different vote choice variables. Here, we use the
following question/variable on voting intentions: “If there were a general
7. Except for Austria, where respondents were 16 years or older.
8. Face-to-face interviews were conducted between May 30 and June 27, 2014.
9. In line with the EES data set, only parties are included that have at least one seat in either the
national assembly or the European Parliament.
10. Data from the European Elections Survey (EES) are available on the website of the Cologne-
based GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=
5160&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.12300.









































election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?” We use a question on
future voting intentions rather than past voting behavior because in some
countries the last parliamentary elections took place well before 2014.
Asking participants to recall past voting behavior is always delicate. In
order not to jeopardize the validity of the results, we decided to focus on
vote intentions, which were measured at the same point in time for all
countries (Ferrı´n, Fraile, and Garcı´a-Albacete 2017).11 The models
predict party choice, with voters’ gender as the only independent
variable. In each model, a number of control variables are added that
might influence party choice, including respondents’ marital status
(dummy married/nonmarried), employment (dummy paid employment/
no paid employment), age (categorical, 16/18–39, 40–54, 55þ),
political efficacy (scale 1–4, with high levels showing low efficacy12),
and political interest (scale 1–4, with high levels showing low interest13).
ANALYSIS
Part I: Mapping the Ideological Positions of Parties of the Right on
Gender Ideology across Western Europe
Figure 1 shows the mean gender role ideology scores of rightist, PRR, and
leftist parties across the 13 countries in our analysis. Our gender equality
experts were asked to place the parties on a 0–10 scale, where 0
represents the view that “women should have an equal role with men in
running business, industry, and government” and 10 the view that “a
woman’s place is in the home.”
There is a great deal of variation in the gender ideologies espoused by
parties of the right in Western Europe. In fact, the mean for rightist
parties was below 5, showing that the parties were, on average, judged
slightly more feminist than traditional in their gender role ideologies,
and the mean score for PRR parties was 6, slightly more traditional than
11. In line with previous studies (Ferrin, Fraile, and Garcia-Albacete 2017), we find that women are
somewhat more likely than men to tick the “refuse” or “don’t know” box when asked about future voting
intentions. We acknowledge this as a potential methodological problem of survey research. Important
for our study, however, is that the gender gap in the use of the “don’t know/refuse” option is not larger for
the question on future voting intentions than for the question on actual (past) voting behavior.
12. The scale is composed of two items: “The (nationality parliament) takes the concerns of
(nationality) citizens into consideration” and “You trust the (nationality parliament).” Answer
categories: 1 ¼ yes, totally; 2 ¼ yes, somewhat; 3 ¼ no, not really; 4 ¼ no, not at all. Cronbach’s
alpha ¼ .823.
13. Question wording: “You are very interested in politics.” Answer categories: 1 ¼ yes, definitely; 2 ¼
yes, to some extent; 3 ¼ no, not really; 4 ¼ no, not at all.









































feminist on average. For leftist parties, the mean was 1, indicating that, on
average, our experts rated leftist parties as highly feminist. Among rightist
parties, the lowest score was 0 and the highest was 10, demonstrating that
parties of the right in Europe can be classified across the full spectrum of
gender role ideology. Thus, we cannot see a single narrative whereby
parties of the right adopt antifeminist gender ideologies.
Given the spread of gender ideology among rightist parties, it is
conceivable that variations in gender gaps in support for parties of the
right might be explained by variations in party ideology. The PRR parties
with the most traditional gender role ideologies were found in Belgium,
Germany, Austria, and France — all with means above 7. The only
country with a PRR party with a feminist gender ideology score (i.e.,
below 5) was the Netherlands, and in Sweden, the mean was 5,
indicating a neutral (neither feminist nor traditional gender ideology).
This is in keeping with the PRR literature, which identifies a shift in the
narrative in Northern Europe that deliberately conflates anti-immigrant/

















FIGURE 1. Mean gender ideology of rightist, PRR, and leftist parties in Europe.
Gender ideology is measured on an 11-point scale, with 0 indicating a feminist
gender ideology and 10 indicating a traditional gender ideology.
14. In 2015, Akkerman conducted a study of the positions of five PRR parties on family relations based
on election manifestos. In Appendix B online, we compare her results to the results of the gender expert
survey and find that the scores are remarkably similar.[14] In both studies, PVV in the Netherlands
displays a more liberal position on family relations and a more progressive stance on gender equality









































Figure 2 shows the correlation between gender ideology, economic
ideology, and liberal/authoritarian ideology (measured using GAL/TAN).
It is clear that there is a closer relationship between liberal/authoritarian
ideology and gender ideology (Pearson’s R of .846**) than between
economic and gender ideology (Pearson’s R of .572**); this relationship
is to be expected given the association between authoritarian attitudes
and attitudes toward gender roles, which are both strongly related to
religiosity. It is clear from Figure 2 that there is a distinctive pattern, with
parties of the left espousing more liberal and feminist ideologies than
parties of the right, and that parties of the PRR are predominantly found
in the top right-hand corner (the most authoritarian and least feminist).
Even so, there is considerable variation within party types, with a good
number of mainstream parties of the right occupying the same
ideological space on gender equality and liberalism as leftist parties.
These data provide evidence that although the general trend for leftist
parties to be more feminist and liberal than parties of the right remains,
there is considerable competition between parties of the left and right in
this ideological space. On this basis, we suggest that this constitutes
evidence of attempts by some rightist parties to represent feminist women
with feminist policies.
The relationship between economic ideology and gender ideology is
considerably weaker. There are a large number of parties of the
mainstream right that espouse both a feminist gender ideology and
rightist economic positions; this provides us with evidence of how a
feminist gender ideology can be accommodated by laissez-faire
economic ideology, as discussed in the introduction to this article. The
extent to which these parties are willing to deploy the apparatus of the
state to transform gender roles is not evident here, but we can see that
feminism and conservatism are not mutually exclusive at least in terms of
rhetorical commitment.
Thus far, we have described patterns in parties’ ideologies without
attempting to develop explanatory accounts of the data. In order to begin
to see how different party ideologies structure gender ideology, we
conduct a (limited) linear regression in Table 2. Because of the small
number of cases, the number of independent variables is limited to
three: economic socialist/laissez-faire ideology, liberal/authoritarian
compared to the other parties. Three parties — Vlaams Belang (Belgium), Freedom Party of Austria
(Austria), and National Front (France) — stand out as the most conservative ones in relation to their
stance on family relations as well as their stance on gender equality.









































ideology, and a dummy distinguishing between populist and nonpopulist
parties. Again, the analysis confirms that rightist parties’ liberal/
authoritarian ideology is a stronger predictor for the gender ideology of
parties than their economic ideology. Only the parameter for liberal/
authoritarian ideology displays a significant effect, showing that parties
become more traditional in their gender stance when they adopt a more
authoritarian ideology. On the other hand, parties’ economic ideology
no longer shapes their gender ideology after controlling for the other
variables. It is parties’ stance on moral issues and not parties’ economic

















FIGURE 2. Correlations between gender ideology and economic versus liberal/
authoritarian (GAL/TAN) ideology.
Table 2. Ordinary least squares regression of gender ideology of rightist parties





Populist right party .666 (.644)
Adjusted R2 .567
N 42
Notes: The B-coefficients are unstandardized coefficients. *** p , .001; þ p , .1. VIF scores range
from 1.211 to 1.67, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in either model.









































Part II: Do Parties of the Right Differ in Their Ability to RecruitWomen
Voters?
The second part of the empirical analysis connects data on party ideology
and gender ideology to data on voting behavior. The goal is to see whether
parties, and rightist parties in particular, differ in their ability to attract the
electoral support of women voters.
Figure 3 shows a histogram of the percentages of women voters in the
electorate of leftist and rightist parties using data on party choice from
the EES.15 Overall, the mean percentage of women voters in the
electorate of leftist parties (mean score of 49.4% female voters) is very
similar to that of rightist parties (mean score of 48.5% female voters). A
country-by-country comparison (not shown here) also revealed that left/
right differences in female vote support are absent in most countries.
Differences are the largest in Denmark, where left parties have an
average 57% of female voters and right parties 43.4%, but these
differences are not statistically significant. Hence, rightist parties are not
any different from leftist parties when it comes to their ability to recruit
female voters. Moreover, the fact that the percentage of women voters for
rightist parties fluctuates from 27.3% to 75% indicates that the electoral
success of at least some rightist parties depends heavily on the electoral
support of women.
Next, we disaggregate the results. Figure 4 compares the percentage of
women voters in the electorate of the populist right and the nonpopulist
right. In most countries — except Italy and the United Kingdom16 — the
percentage of women voters is higher among nonpopulist than among
populist right parties, confirming the populist radical right gender gap.
Especially in Sweden, France, and Finland, women form a minority of
the populist right electorate (corresponding with 21.1%, 30.6%, 32.4%,,
and 34.7% of women voters respectively). But in Austria and the
Netherlands, the populist electorate is more gender balanced. These
findings confirm recent studies suggesting that the gender gap in
populist radical right voting is not universal (Spierings and Zaslove 2015)
and/or might be closing over time (Mayer 2015).
In order to understand variation in the electoral support rightist parties
receive from women, it is important to look not only at differences
15. We removed outliers.
16. In Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Italy, there were fewer than 50 PRR voters. Given these
small sample sizes, we cannot draw inferences about the proportion of women voters for the PRR in
these countries using the ESS.









































between populist and nonpopulist parties. The role of gender ideology
should also be addressed. In order to do so, we estimate a model of vote
choice in Table 3. Given the diversity in parties within one country and
the differences in parties between countries, we are unable to use “party
choice” as the outcome variable. Therefore, we opted to create a
categorical variable as our outcome variable. The outcome variable
groups parties according to their party ideology (left/right) and gender
ideology (feminist/traditional17), thus distinguishing between (1) left
parties with feminist gender ideologies, (2) left parties with traditional

















FIGURE 3. Percentage of women in the electorate of leftist and rightist parties. For
leftist parties:N ¼ 44, mean ¼ 49.4, standard deviation ¼ 8.6, min. ¼ 25, max. ¼
69.4. For rightist parties: N ¼ 49, mean ¼ 48.5, standard deviation ¼ 11; min. ¼
27.3, max. ¼ 75.
17. Parties with a “feminist” gender ideology scored 5 or higher on the gender ideology scale. Parties
with a “traditional” ideology scored less than 5 on the gender ideology scale.

























































FIGURE 4. Percentage of women in the electorate of populist versus nonpopulist
right parties. The number of respondents who supported the PRR was fewer than
50 in Belgium, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Table 3. Multinomial logistic regression predicting party choice by gender
ideology
Vote for Left Party with
Feminist Gender Ideology
Vote for Right Party with
Feminist Gender Ideology
B (S.E.) B (S.E.)
Intercept 1.635 (.169)*** 2.169 (.182)***
Gender (¼ female) .384 (.061)*** .282 (.065)***
Marital status (¼ not
married)
.157 (.064)* –.074 (.069)
Employment (¼ paid
employment)
– .017 (.069) –.104 (.074)
Age (in categories)
16/18–39 years .303 (.08)*** .107 (.087)
40–54 years .175 (.081)* –.095 (.088)
Political efficacy –.382 (.043)*** –.651 (.048)***
Political interest – .140 (.034)*** –.134 (.037)***
Nagelkerke R2 .208
N 9.410
Notes: The model is a fixed-effects model with country dummies. Reference category is “vote for right
party with traditional gender ideology.” The fourth category, “vote for left party with traditional gender
ideology,” remains empty and therefore is not included in the table. The B-coefficients are
unstandardized coefficients. *** p, .001; ** p, .01; * p, .05.









































(4) right parties with traditional gender ideologies. The second category
(left parties with traditional gender ideologies) is empty and therefore is
not included in Table 3. The reference category is right parties with
traditional gender ideologies. Voters’ gender is the independent variable
in the model, so we assess the extent to which voters’ gender influences
the probability that a voter votes for a party in one of the categories of the
dependent variables. We control for respondents’ marital status, paid
employment, age, political efficacy, and political interest. In order to
control for institutional variation between countries, we added country
fixed effects.
Table 3 predicts voters’ choice for a right party with a traditional gender
ideology. The results indicate that, after controlling for third variables, the
“gender” variable remains statistically significant for both outcome
categories. Women are more likely than men to vote for a left party with
a feminist gender ideology compared with a right party with a traditional
gender ideology. A calculation of the odds ratio (Exp(B) ¼ 1.469)
indicates that the odds that women make that choice is 1.5 times greater
than men making that choice. This again confirms the “modern gender
gap.” Interestingly, women are also more likely to vote for a right party
with a feminist gender ideology (Exp(B) ¼ 1.326) compared with a party
with a traditional gender ideology. This shows that the position rightist
parties take on gender issues influences the party’s level of support
among women voters. In particular, rightist parties that adopt a more
feminist stance on gender issues are able to attract more women voters
than rightist parties with a more traditional gender view. It is mostly
center-right parties that adopt a more feminist position on gender issues
in their public stance and have a majority of female voters among their
electorate. Examples are the Christian democratic parties CD&V
(Christian Democratic and Flemish) in Belgium and Kristdemokraterna
in Sweden and the liberal parties Centerpartiet in Sweden and the
Swedish People’s Party of Finland. These two liberal parties have an
outspoken feminist gender ideology, so it is possible that they attract
more feminist women voters. The two Christian democratic parties, on
the other hand, adopt a more equivocal stance on gender issues,
combining positions that at times support feminist policy interventions
and at other times advocating traditional gender roles, which arguably
allows them to attract the votes of right-leaning women in their
respective countries.
Some of the control variables also show significant results. In line with
other studies predicting party choice, we find that left parties draw









































significantly less from the support of married respondents and older (age
55þ) voters. These voters have a higher chance of voting for a right-wing
party. The gender ideology of the right party does not play a role here:
married and older voters do not prefer a traditional right party over a
feminist right party (or vice versa). Decreasing levels of political efficacy
and interest decrease the chance that voters cast a vote for a feminist
(either left or right) party; they instead opt for a right party with a
traditional gender ideology. Age plays a role, with the oldest category of
respondents (age 55þ) having a significantly higher chance of voting for
a right party with a traditional gender ideology.
Table 4 finally shows the same model but with an interaction effect
between gender and age. The results show that especially younger
women have a higher chance of voting for a left party with a feminist
gender ideology. This confirms the gender-generation gap (Norris 1999),
namely, that especially younger women are drawn to leftist, feminist
parties. Right parties with a feminist gender ideology remain more
attractive to women in general than right parties with a traditional gender
ideology.
DISCUSSION
The exploratory analysis conducted in this article is a first step toward
bringing party behavior, particularly party ideology, into studies of
gender and electoral support for rightist parties. We show evidence of
rightist parties that adopt feminist gender ideologies succeeding in
securing more women’s votes than rightist parties that espouse traditional
gender ideologies. Future research should add more data points from
across time and space. Changes in party gender ideologies over time
might be measured through the systematic analysis of party manifestos
and leaders’ speeches, which would triangulate our findings from expert
survey evidence — reducing the risk of bias and path dependency in the
measurements — and allow us to investigate the relationship between
political leadership and the gender gap. Our findings suggest that such
research would be a fruitful endeavor for subsequent study.
Here we were able to demonstrate that there is considerable variation in
the gender ideologies of rightist parties, with many mainstream parties of
the right competing with parties of the left over what we might consider
feminist and liberal ideological space. Although the general trend for
leftist parties to be more feminist and liberal than parties of the right









































holds, there is nonetheless considerable competition between parties of the
left and the right that might be suggestive of rightist party attempts to
represent feminist women. We find, in other words, that political parties
can combine feminism with rightist economic ideologies. Parties of the
populist radical right overall adopt more traditional gender ideologies
than parties of the mainstream right, even though there is some
variation. Although the literature has identified a shift toward more
feminist positions among some elements of the PRR, particularly in
Northern Europe, these parties remain considerably less feminist in their
values than many other parties of the right. Notably, we found only one
example of a PRR party with a feminist gender ideology score (PVV in
the Netherlands).
How much attention a party gives to gender issues is best understood as
determined by its overall position on the libertarian-authoritarian scale
rather than linked to its position on gender equality per se. This
confirms extant literature that suggests that rightist parties that combine
Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression predicting party choice by gender
ideology, with interaction effects
Vote for Left Party with
Feminist Gender Ideology
Vote for Right Party with
Feminist Gender Ideology
B (S.E.) B (S.E.)
Intercept 1.647 (.171)*** 2.181 (.184)***
Gender (¼ female) .346 (.086)*** .260 (.090)**
Marital status (¼ not
married)
.170 (.065)** 2.070 (.070)
Employment (¼ paid
employment)
2.018 (.069) 2.106 (.074)
Age (in categories)
16/18–39 years .152 (.109) .089 (.116)
40–54 years .245 (.108)* 2.124 (.117)
Political efficacy 2.383 (.043)*** 2.652 (.048)***
Political interest 2.138 (.034)*** 2.135 (.037)***
Female * 16/18–39
years
.296 (.149)* .049 (.162)
Female * 40–54 years 2.138 (.145) .050 (.156)
Nagelkerke R2 .210
N 9.410
Notes: The model is a fixed effect model with country dummies. Reference category is “vote for right
party with traditional gender ideology.” The fourth category, “vote for left party with traditional gender
ideology,” remains empty and therefore is not included in the table. The B-coefficients are
unstandardized coefficients. *** p, .001; ** p, .01; * p, .05.









































laissez-faire economic values with liberal moral values are most likely to
adopt feminist positions. In terms of attracting women voters, we find
that rightist parties that adopt a feminist gender ideology are able to
attract more women voters than other parties of the right. These are
mostly center-right parties such as the Christian democratic CD&V in
Belgium and the Kristdemokraterna in Sweden and the liberal parties
Centerpartiet in Sweden and the Swedish People’s Party of Finland. The
two Christian democratic parties specifically combine feminist and
traditional elements in their gender ideology, which arguably allows
them to attract right-leaning women voters.
We have explored the role that party ideology plays in gender differences
in party support and shown that there is considerable variation in how
parties combine economic, moral, and gender ideologies that is, in turn,
related to their recruitment of women voters. Future studies of the
international gender gap in left-right party support should gather
systematic information about party positioning to incorporate into
explanatory models aimed at deriving more convincing accounts of how
and why gender gaps vary across time and space.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/S1743923X17000599.
Rosie Campbell is Professor of Politics at Birkbeck, University of London:
r.campbell@bbk.ac.uk; Silvia Erzeel is Assistant Professor and Postdoctoral
Researcher at Vrije Universiteit Brussel: Silvia.Erzeel@vub.be
REFERENCES
Abendscho¨n, Simone, and Stephanie Steinmetz. 2014. “The Gender Gap in Voting
Revisited: Women’s Party Preferences in a European Context.” Social Politics 21 (2):
315–44.
Akkerman, Tjitske. 2015. “Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe: A
Comparative Analysis of Policy Agendas.” Patterns of Prejudice 49 (1–2): 37–60.
Akkerman, Tjitske, Sarah L. de Lange, and Matthijs Rooduijn. 2016. Radical Right-Wing
Populist Parties in Western Europe. London: Routledge.
Arzheimer, Kai, and Elizabeth Carter. 2006. “Political Opportunity Structures and Right-
Wing Party Success.” European Journal of Political Research 41 (3): 419–43.
Bakker, Ryan, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks,
Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2015.









































“Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File,
1999–2010.” Party Politics 21 (1): 143–52.
Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2006. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London:
Routledge.
Betz, Hans-George. 1993. “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist
Parties in Western Europe.” Comparative Politics 25 (4): 413–27.
Bonk, Kathy. 1988. “The Selling of the ‘Gender Gap’: The Role of Organised Feminism.”
In The Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social Construction of Political Influence, ed.
Carol Mueller. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 82–101.
Budge, Ian. 2000. “Expert Judgements of Party Policy Positions: Uses and Limitations in
Political Research.” European Journal of Political Research 37 (1): 103–13.
Campbell, Rosie. 2016. “Representing Women Voters: The Role of the Gender Gap and
the Response of Political Parties.” Party Politics 22 (5): 587–97.
Celis, Karen. 2006. “Substantive Representation of Women: The Representation of
Women’s Interests and the Impact of Descriptive Representation in the Belgian
Parliament (1900–1979).” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 28 (2): 85–114.
Celis, Karen, and Sarah Childs. 2012. “The Substantive Representation of Women: What to
Do with Conservative Claims?” Political Studies 60 (1): 213–25.
———. eds. 2014. Gender, Conservatism and Political Representation. Colchester: ECPR
Press.
Celis, Karen, Sarah Childs, Johanna Kantola, and Mona Lena Krook. 2014. “Constituting
Women’s Interests through Representative Claims.” Politics & Gender 10 (2): 149–74.
Childs, Sarah, and Paul Webb. 2012. Sex, Gender and the Conservative Party: From Iron
Ladies to Kitten Heels. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
de Lange, Sarah L., and Liza M. Mu¨gge. 2015. “Gender and right-Wing Populism in the
Low Countries: Ideological Variations across Parties and Time.” Patterns of Prejudice 49
(1–2): 61–80.
Duverger, Maurice. 1955. The Political Role of Women. Paris: UNESCO.
Erzeel, Silvia, and Karen Celis. 2016. “Political Parties, Ideology and Women’s Substantive
Representation.” Party Politics 22 (5): 576–86.
Erzeel, Silvia, Karen Celis, and Didier Caluwaerts. 2014. “Are Conservatism and Feminism
Mutually Exclusive? A Study of ‘Feminist Conservative’ Voters in Belgium.” In Gender,
Conservatism and Political Representation, eds. Karen Celis and Sarah Childs.
Colchester: ECPR Press, 273–86.
Ferrı´n, Monica, Marta Fraile, and Gema Garcı´a-Albacete. 2017. “The Gender Gap in
Political Knowledge: Is It All about Guessing? An Experimental Approach.”
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 29 (1): 111–32.
Ford, Robert, and Matthew Goodwin. 2014. Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the
Radical Right in Britain. London: Routledge.
Giger, Nathalie. 2009. “Towards a Modern Gender Gap in Europe? A Comparative
Analysis of Voting Behavior in 12 Countries.” Social Science Journal 46 (3): 474–92.
Gillion, Daniel Q., Jonathan McDonald Ladd, and Marc Meredith. 2014. “Education,
Party Polarization and the Origins of the Partisan Gender Gap in U.S. Party
Identification.” Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2301103## (accessed January 24, 2018).
Givens, Terri. 2004. “The Radical Right Gender Gap.” Comparative Political Studies 37
(1): 30–54.
Harteveld, Eelco, Wouter Van Der Brug, Stefan Dahlberg, and Andrej Kokkonen. 2015.
“The Gender Gap in Populist Radical-Right Voting: Examining the Demand Side in
Western and Eastern Europe.” Patterns of Prejudice 49 (1–2): 103–34.









































Hooghe, Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevich, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards,
Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2010.
“Reliability and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert Surveys on Party
Positioning.” European Journal of Political Research 49 (5): 687–703.
Huber, John, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. “Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party
Locations in 42 Societies.” Party Politics 1 (1): 73–111.
Immerzeel, Tim, Hilde Coffe´, and Tanja van der Lippe. 2015. “Explaining the Gender
Gap in Radical Right Voting: A Cross-national Investigation in 12 Western European
Countries.” Comparative European Politics 13 (2): 263–86.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2000. “The Developmental Theory of the Gender
Gap: Women and Men’s Voting Behaviour in Global Perspective.” International
Political Science Review 21 (4): 441–62.
———. 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1997. The Radical Right in Europe: AComparative Analysis. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Lovenduski, Joni, and Pippa Norris. 2003. “Westminster Women: The Politics of Presence.”
Political Studies 51 (1): 84–102.
Lubbers, Marcel, Me´rove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. “Extreme Right-Wing
Voting in Western Europe.” European Journal of Political Research 41 (3): 345–78.
Mair, Peter. 2001. “Searching for the Position of Political Actors: A Review of Approaches
and a Critical Evaluation of Expert Surveys.” In Estimating the Policy Positions of
Political Actors, ed. Michael Laver. London: Routledge, 10–30.
Mayer, Nonna. 2015. “The Closing of the Radical Right Gender Gap in France?” French
Politics 13 (4): 391–414.
Meret, Susi, and Birte Siim. 2013. “Gender, Populism and Politics of Belonging:
Discourses of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Denmark, Norway and Austria.” In
Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emerging European Public Sphere, eds.
Birte Siim and Monika Mokre. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 78–96.
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
———. 2013. “Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So
What?” European Journal of Political Research 52 (1): 1–19.
Mudde, Cas, and Cristo´bal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2015. “Vox Populi or Vox Masculini?
Populism and Gender in Northern Europe and South America.” Patterns of Prejudice
49 (1–2): 16–36.
Mueller, Carol. 1988a. “The Empowerment of Women: Polling and the Women’s Voting
Bloc.” In The Politics of the Gender Gap: The Social Construction of Political Influence,
ed. Carol Mueller. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 16–36.
———. ed. 1988b. The Politics of the Gender Gap. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Norris, Pippa. 1999. “Gender: A Gender-Generation Gap?” In Critical Elections: British
Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective, eds. Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris.
London: Sage, 146–63.
———. 2005. Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Norton, Philip, and David M. Wood. 1993. Back from Westminster: British Members of
Parliament and Their Constituents. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
Rohrschneider, Robert, and Stephen Whitefield. 2009. “Understanding Cleavages in Party
Systems: Issue Position and Issue Salience in 13 Post-Communist Democracies.”
Comparative Political Studies 42 (2): 280–313.









































Schmitt, Hermann, Sara B. Hobolt, Sebastian Adrian Popa, and Eftichia Teperoglou. 2015.
European Parliament Election Study 2014, Voter Study, First Post-Election Survey.
GESIS Data Archive: Cologne. ZA5161 Data File Version, 1:0.
Spierings, Niels, and Andrej Zaslove. 2015. “Gendering the Vote for Populist Radical-Right
Parties.” Patterns of Prejudice 49 (1–2): 135–62.
———. 2017. “Gender, Populist Attitudes, and Voting: Explaining the Gender Gap in
Voting for Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left Parties.” West European
Politics 40 (4):821–47.
Spierings, Niels, Andrej Zaslove, Liza M. Mu¨gge, and Sarah L. de Lange. 2015. “Gender
and Populist Radical-Right Politics: An Introduction.” Patterns of Prejudice 49 (1–2): 3–
15.
Steenbergen, Marco R., and Gary Marks. 2007. “Evaluating Expert Judgments.” European
Journal of Political Research 46 (3): 347–66.
Tingsten, Herbert. 1937. Political Behavior. Totowa, NJ: Bedminster.
Van Dijk, Teun. 2006. “Ideology and Discourse Analysis.” Journal of Political Ideologies 11
(2): 115–40.
Van Kessel, Stijn. 2015. Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Wa¨ngnerud, Lena. 2000. “Testing the Politics of Presence: Women’s Representation in the
Swedish Riksdag.” Scandinavian Political Studies 23 (1): 67–91.
Wiliarty, Sarah. 2010. The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany: BringingWomen to
the Party. New York: Cambridge University Press.
26 ROSIE CAMPBELL AND SILVIA ERZEEL
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
